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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici are Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, House Democratic Leader 
Nancy Pelosi, and the following congressional leaders and leaders of the relevant 
committees of jurisdiction:   
Sen. Dick Durbin  
(Assistant Majority Leader) 
 
Rep. Steny H. Hoyer  
(House Democratic Whip) 
Sen. Charles Schumer  
(Conference Vice Chair) 
 
Rep. James E. Clyburn  
(Democratic Assistant Leader) 
Sen. Patty Murray  
(Conference Secretary) 
 
Rep. John B. Larson  
(Chair of Democratic Caucus) 
Sen. Max Baucus  
(Chair, Committee on Finance) 
 
Rep. Xavier Becerra  
(Vice Chair of Democratic Caucus) 
Sen. Tom Harkin  
(Chair, Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions) 
Rep. John D. Dingell  
(Sponsor of House Health Care 
reform legislation) 
 
Sen. Patrick Leahy  
(Chair, Committee on the Judiciary) 
Rep. Henry A. Waxman  
(Ranking Member, Committee on 
Energy and Commerce) 
 
Sen. Barbara Mikulski 
(Chair, HELP Subcommittee on 
Retirement and Aging) 
Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr.  
(Ranking Member, Commerce 
Subcommittee on Health) 
 
Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV 
(Chair, Committee on Commerce) 
 
Rep. Sander M. Levin  
(Ranking Member, Committee on 
Ways and Means) 
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Rep. Fortney Pete Stark  
(Ranking Member, Ways and Means 
Subcommittee on Health) 
 
Rep. George Miller  
(Ranking Member, Education and the 
Workforce Committee) 
 
Rep. Robert E. Andrews  
(Ranking Member, Education and 
Workforce Subcommittee on Health) 
Rep. John Conyers, Jr.  
(Ranking Member, Committee on the 
Judiciary) 
 
Rep. Jerrold Nadler  
(Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
Constitution) 
 
  
Amici file this brief for two reasons.1  First, as elected Members of Congress, 
amici have a duty to support the Constitution, and in exercise of that duty they write 
to defend the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  
The Act, closely debated in Congress and around the country for well over a year, is 
a landmark accomplishment of the national Legislature, which brings to fruition a 
decades-long effort to guarantee comprehensive, affordable, and secure health care 
insurance for all Americans.  Amici paid careful attention to Supreme Court 
precedents defining the proper bounds of Congress’s constitutional authority, and 
relied upon these established rules in formulating, debating, and voting on the Act.  
They wish to put before the Court their views on why the Act is a valid exercise of 
Congress’s Article I powers. 
                                                          
 1 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a), amici state that all parties consent 
to the filing of this brief. 
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Second, amici believe that Appellees’ legal theories, if embraced by the 
courts, would seriously undermine Congress’s constitutional authority and its 
practical ability to address pressing national problems.  Congress regularly relies on 
its enumerated powers to protect American consumers and workers, keep families 
safe, and ensure civil rights.  Amici take seriously their oath to “support and defend 
the Constitution of the United States,” and write in their constitutional role as 
Members of a coequal branch of government.  
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The central and dispositive fact in this case is that the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“the Act” or “ACA”), including the provision that individuals 
maintain minimum health insurance coverage, is a congressional regulation of the 
interstate health insurance market.  The effective regulation of health insurance, 
moreover, is critical to the effective functioning of the enormously important 
national health care market.  The assertion that Congress lacks the legislative 
authority to regulate these national, commercial markets is an astonishing 
proposition.  Its acceptance would mean that the Commerce Clause falls short of 
authorizing the full and effective regulation of interstate commerce.  That novel 
claim is inconsistent with the Constitution and contrary to longstanding Supreme 
Court precedent.  See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824) (the 
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commerce power is “complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution … in plain 
terms”). 
The ACA includes a minimum coverage requirement (“MCR”) as part of its 
comprehensive regulatory plan designed to ensure that affordable health insurance 
coverage is widely available.  The MCR is accompanied by a penalty provision 
applicable to most taxpayers that encourages individuals who lack adequate health 
insurance to obtain coverage that meets minimum standards.  Congress determined 
after exhaustive hearings that without this financial incentive for individuals to 
maintain adequate coverage, it would not be financially practicable to prohibit 
insurance companies from denying coverage to those with pre-existing conditions or 
otherwise to regulate effectively the national markets in health insurance and health 
care.  
Appellees, however, urge this Court to carve out an unprecedented exception 
to Congress’s plenary authority to regulate interstate commerce.  They contend that 
even matters vital to the national economy may not be regulated if they fall within an 
artificial category that Appellees call “inactivity.”  This is descriptively inaccurate, 
because (1) the penalty for failing to maintain minimum coverage applies only to 
those who participate in the economy by earning sufficient taxable income that they 
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are otherwise required to file federal income tax returns and (2) virtually everyone 
subject to the penalty participates in some way in the health care market in any given 
year even if they choose not to purchase health insurance.  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court long ago rejected using arbitrary characterizations to constrain Congress’s 
power to regulate the national economy.   See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 556 (1995).   
There is nothing unprecedented about Congress imposing requirements on 
citizens who would prefer to be left alone, when those regulations are necessary to 
accomplish an objective wholly within the powers delegated to Congress.  See, e.g., 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).  The provision is no more intrusive than 
Social Security or Medicare.  The Social Security Act requires individuals to make 
payments to provide for their retirement.  Medicare requires individuals to make 
payments to provide for their health coverage after they are 65 years of age or if they 
meet other criteria.  The ACA requires individuals to obtain health coverage before 
they are 65.  Under Medicare, there is one predominant payer, the government, and 
individuals choose between privately insured plans or a government-administered 
plan that relies on private providers.  Under the ACA, individuals are given an 
option to choose among insurers in the private market.  Neither Social Security nor 
Medicare nor the ACA is such a novel intrusion into liberty that judges would be 
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justified in overriding the considered judgment of the elected branches that adopted 
those laws. 
As members of Congress, we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s concern, 
stated in cases such as Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), 
that Congress not use the commerce power to regulate matters that are local and 
non-economic.  Those cases involved the attempt to regulate local crime (guns near 
schools and violence against women) because of a presumed ultimate effect on 
interstate commerce.  The MCR, in contrast, is itself a regulation of an interstate 
commercial matter– health insurance.  The effective functioning of that major 
commercial activity is critical to the national health care market in which virtually 
every American participates.  This case tests no limits and approaches no slippery 
slope.  Notwithstanding the improbable hypotheticals mooted before the District 
Court, Congress never has required Americans to exercise or eat certain foods – and 
in our view it never would.  Were Congress ever to enact laws of that kind infringing 
on personal autonomy, the judiciary would have ample tools under the liberty clause 
of the Fifth Amendment to identify and enforce constitutional limits.  See Cruzan v. 
Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).  What the ACA regulates is not 
personal autonomy, but commercial transactions.   
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Suggestions that sustaining the MCR would mean that Congress could 
mandate the purchase of cars or comparable items are also disingenuous.  The 
provision requiring minimum health insurance cannot be viewed in isolation.  In this 
case, Congress has regulated a unique market, insurance that provides a means of 
paying for health care services.  A decision to rely on “on one’s savings, or the 
backstop of free or reduced-cost emergency room services” to pay for services in the 
health care market is as surely an economic decision as the purchase of health 
insurance – and both are equally subject to Commerce Clause regulation.  Liberty 
University, Inc. v. Geithner, 2010 WL 4860299, at *15 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010). 
The MCR regulates participation in these singular markets, which play a 
central role in the nation’s commerce.  And were there any doubt that the MCR is a 
valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power, the Necessary and Proper Clause 
provides a reinforcing and independent basis for the provision’s constitutionality.  
The minimum coverage provision is a valid means to the full and effective exercise 
of Congress’s regulation of interstate commerce in the larger Act. 
Appellees’ disagreement with the manner Congress has chosen to regulate 
two related and important national markets is an occasion for political debate, not a 
matter for judicial imposition.  Amici stand by the wisdom of the Act, which expands 
quality, affordable insurance to millions of Americans while limiting costs and 
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reducing the deficit.  But, as Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote for the Supreme Court 
nearly 75 years ago:  
Whether wisdom or unwisdom resides in the scheme of [the statute in 
question], it is not for us to say. The answer to such inquiries must come from 
Congress, not the courts.  
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the 
Social Security Act of 1935). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, 
INCLUDING ITS MINIMUM COVERAGE REQUIREMENT, IS A 
VALID EXERCISE OF CONGRESS’S ENUMERATED 
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO REGULATE COMMERCE 
AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES. 
A. Congress Has Plenary Authority To Regulate Interstate Markets, 
Including Matters Affecting The Prices Of Commodities Traded 
In Interstate Commerce. 
 The Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power … To regulate 
Commerce … among the several States.”  Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  In decisions reaching 
back to the early years of the Republic, the Supreme Court has recognized that this 
crucial provision grants Congress plenary power to regulate the nation’s commercial 
affairs.  For, as the Supreme Court recently observed, “The Commerce Clause 
emerged as the Framers’ response to the central problem giving rise to the 
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Constitution itself: the absence of any federal commerce power under the Articles of 
Confederation.”  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005).  
Almost two hundred years ago, the Supreme Court stated that Congress’s 
regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause “is plenary as to [its] objects” and 
“co-extensive with the subject itself.”  Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197.   Numerous 
decisions establish that when Congress regulates an interstate market it acts within 
the core of the Commerce Clause – and that “the power to regulate commerce … 
extends” not just to the literal commercial transactions of the relevant market but 
also to behavior or acts “which interfere with, obstruct, or prevent the due exercise 
of the power to regulate commerce” in that market.  United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 
(12 Pet.) 72, 78 (1838); see also Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189-90.  Thus, “Congress, of 
course, can do anything which, in the exercise by itself of a fair discretion, may be 
deemed appropriate to save the act of interstate commerce from prevention or 
interruption, or to make that act more secure, more reliable, or more efficient.”  
Second Employers’ Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 48 (1912).  Congress’s commerce 
power is “complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution.”  Gibbons, 
22 U.S. at 196 (quoted in Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 
(1981)).      
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 04/11/2011     Page: 21 of 45
  10  
 
 It has long been settled, therefore, that “Congress plainly has power to 
regulate the price” of products “distributed through the medium of interstate 
commerce [and] possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.”  
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942).  In doing so, 
Congress may decide “to give protection to sellers or purchasers or both.” Currin v. 
Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 11 (1939).  “It is of the essence of the plenary power conferred 
that Congress may exercise its discretion in the use of the power….  Congress may 
consider and weigh relative situations and needs.”  Id. at 14.  The Court’s modern 
cases reaffirm that the commerce power authorizes the regulation of any matter that 
“affects the price structure and federal regulation of” an interstate market.  Perez v. 
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971).       
 In two recent cases, Lopez and Morrison, the Court held that Congress cannot 
use an attenuated connection to interstate commerce to enact laws governing purely 
local, non-commercial matters.  Those cases involved provisions governing criminal 
behavior – possessing guns near a school and gender-motivated violence – with no 
immediate connection to any interstate market.  The Court cautioned against 
reasoning that would permit congressional regulation of matters unrelated to the 
national economy by “pil[ing] inference upon inference in a manner that would bid 
fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general 
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police power of the sort retained by the States.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.  In order to 
maintain the constitutional principle that Congress is a legislature of limited and 
enumerated powers, Lopez and Morrison identified a limiting principle to the 
instrumental use of the commerce power to regulate non-commercial matters: the 
gap between some local, non-economic matter that Congress wishes to regulate and 
interstate commerce cannot be bridged by pointing to a remote causal relationship.  
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.   
The Court has made clear that the limitation applied in Lopez and Morrison 
does not detract from Congress’s plenary authority to regulate interstate commerce 
itself.  In Raich, the Court reaffirmed that where “the [act under review] is a statute 
that directly regulates economic, commercial activity, our opinion in Morrison casts 
no doubt on its constitutionality.”  545 U.S. at 26.  Indeed, the “case law firmly 
establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities” as part of interstate 
commerce regulation.  Id. at 17; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (confirming 
Congress’s unquestioned regulatory authority “where a general regulatory statute 
bears a substantial relation to commerce” (emphasis omitted)).  As Justice Kennedy 
explained, “Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that 
we have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable national economy.”  
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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B. The Act, Of Which The Minimum Coverage Requirement Is An 
Integral Part, Is A Constitutional Regulation Of Interstate 
Commerce. 
1. The Commerce Clause authorizes the minimum coverage 
requirement as congressional regulation of the national 
health insurance market.   
 The Supreme Court recognized long ago that the Commerce Clause 
authorizes Congress to regulate “the business of insurance”:  “[t]hat power … is 
vested in the Congress, available to be exercised for the national welfare as Congress 
shall deem necessary.”  United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533, 
552-53 (1944).   
 In the Act, Congress set forth findings about the central role of health 
insurance in the U.S. economy.  In 2009, the U.S. spent more than 17% of its gross 
domestic product on health care.  ACA § 10106(a).  Despite that expense, some 45 
million Americans lacked health insurance for at least part of the year before 
enactment of the ACA.  One reason so many Americans lacked health insurance is 
that prior to the ACA, insurers designed practices to exclude those most in need of 
medical care, often by avoiding coverage of people with pre-existing conditions.  
Given that as many as 129 million Americans under 65 have some pre-existing 
condition, Dept. of Health & Human Svcs., At Risk: Pre-Existing Conditions Could 
Affect 1 in 2 Americans (2011), http://www.healthcare.gov/center/reports/ 
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preexisting.html, these practices placed numerous families at risk for loss of health 
insurance.     
Uninsured Americans experience injury, sickness, and the need for medical 
services.  According to recent reports, 94% of the long-term uninsured have received 
some medical care.  June E. O’Neill & Dave M. O’Neill, Who Are the Uninsured? 
An Analysis of America’s Uninsured Population, Their Characteristics, and their 
Health 20-22 (2009).  When Americans lack health insurance, they often resort to 
treatment in emergency rooms: according to one study, in 2007, 62.6% of the 
uninsured at a given point in time had made at least one visit to a doctor or 
emergency room within the previous year.  Center for Health Statistics, Health, 
United States, 2009, at 318. 
America is a charitable and caring nation, and the uninsured are, in many 
instances, provided basic health care with the cost passed on to other participants in 
the market.  A federal statute requires as much.  See Emergency Medical Treatment 
and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.  The cost of medical care for the uninsured is 
shifted through the interstate market.  In 2008, such cost-shifting amounted to $43 
billion, see Congressional Budget Office, Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health 
Insurance Proposals 114 (Dec. 2008), creating a hidden burden passed along to 
other market participants through increased fees and premiums and to taxpayers 
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through burdens on the public fisc.  Congress, in passing the Act, understood that 
barriers to full coverage in the health insurance market have substantial economic 
effects extending beyond the health care sector.  See, e.g., ACA § 10106 (medical 
expenses contribute to 62% of personal bankruptcies). 
The Act regulates the health insurance market to protect the American people 
by barring insurers from refusing or rescinding coverage based on pre-existing 
conditions, establishing new insurance markets, and promoting access to affordable 
insurance.  It also requires individuals, with certain specified exceptions, to maintain 
minimum levels of health care coverage or (in some cases) pay a tax penalty.  The 
Act as a whole is thus a core exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power to 
regulate the interstate health insurance industry. 
 The challenged component of the Act, the MCR, fits within Congress’s 
enumerated Commerce Clause authority because (1) on its own it regulates this 
interstate market, and (2) it is an integral part of Congress’s broader regulatory 
scheme of assuring affordable health insurance coverage for all Americans.   
First, the MCR directly addresses the affordability of health insurance and 
therefore (in light of the basic principle that insurance rests on the pooling of risks) 
its availability in the private market.  As Congress explained, the MCR “regulates 
activity that is commercial and economic in nature: economic and financial 
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decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is 
purchased.”  ACA § 1501(a)(2)(A).  Congress acted for the purposes of “giv[ing] 
protection to sellers [and] purchasers” and stabilizing “the price structure” of the 
health care insurance market – regulatory purposes the Supreme Court has long 
recognized as within the core of the commerce power.  See Currin, 306 U.S. at 11; 
Perez, 402 U.S. at 151.  As with the law in Raich, the MCR regulates commerce by 
addressing “supply and demand in the national market” for health insurance.  See 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.   
As a matter of economic fact, whether an individual purchases health 
insurance, self-insures, or ignores the issue altogether is one element in the mass of 
decisions (and failures to decide) that determine the cost, and thus availability, of 
health insurance in the market.  Each of these choices is “economic” in a 
straightforward business sense: health insurance, unlike carrying guns near schools, 
is a product which people buy and sell.  The Court employs a “practical conception 
of commercial regulation.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 25 n.35 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
574 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  It is “well established” that the commerce power 
“includes the power to regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce 
are dealt in.”  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128.  The failure to obtain health insurance 
affects the cost of health insurance for others and, in the future, for oneself.   
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 Second, Congress expressly found that the MCR “is an essential part of this 
larger regulation of economic activity,” the absence of which “would undercut 
Federal regulation of the health insurance market.”  ACA § 10106.  Congress found 
that the MCR is “essential” for a simple reason: otherwise, the new regulations 
would encourage individuals to delay or forgo insurance, knowing that they could 
not be excluded later for pre-existing conditions.  That would cause higher insurance 
prices and greater cost-shifting.  The MCR, however, will “significantly reduce[] the 
uninsured” and “together with the [Act’s] other provisions … lower health insurance 
premiums.”  Id.  
When Congress creates a “comprehensive regulatory regime,” it may regulate 
a particular matter if the “failure to regulate ... would leave a gaping hole in the” 
statutory regime.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.  Without the MCR, the objective of the 
Act’s regulation of interstate commerce would be far more difficult, if not 
impossible, to attain.  “Leaving [individuals who do not purchase health care 
insurance although financially able to do so] outside the regulatory scheme would 
have a substantial influence on price and market conditions,” id. at 19, and so 
undermine Congress’s objectives.   As the Court explained in Raich, in such 
circumstances the judiciary will  “refuse to excise individual components of th[e] 
larger scheme.”  Id. at 22.  The same rule holds here. 
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 Viewed through the lens of recent cases, the Act and its MCR exercise the 
core of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 
(commerce power encompasses “the channels of interstate commerce ... the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 
commerce ... [and] activities affecting commerce”).  The Act regulates the channels 
of interstate commerce, which permit the existence of insurance markets.  It also 
regulates “things in interstate commerce” – insurance contracts and transactions.  
See South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 550 (insurance “involve[s] the 
transmission of great quantities of money, documents, and communications across 
dozens of state lines”).  Finally, health insurance makes up a substantial interstate 
market itself and provides a means of payment for participants in the unique national 
health care market, and so the MCR regulates matters “substantially affecting 
interstate commerce.” 
2. The minimum coverage requirement is fully consistent with 
limits on the Commerce Clause described in recent Supreme 
Court decisions   
The MCR, as a regulation of an economic market, also complies with the 
limits on Congress’s authority articulated in Lopez and Morrison.  The Act regulates 
interstate commerce, not in order to reach some further, non-commercial behavior 
but precisely in order to regulate a commercial market to achieve national purposes.  
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There is thus no gap between the regulation and interstate commerce.  As the 
Supreme Court concluded in Raich, where Congress’s clear purpose is to regulate an 
interstate market, the limiting principle of Lopez and Morrison is irrelevant.  See 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 26.  We are sensitive to the Court’s concern that Congress not 
overstep its authority by using its national commercial powers to regulate truly local 
or non-economic matters that do not sufficiently affect commerce.  But that is 
simply not this case.  No chain of inferences is necessary to relate the MCR to the 
regulation of interstate commerce; instead, Congress is regulating a national market 
– the very subject matter and purpose of the Commerce Clause. 
The relevant limitation to the MCR is that expressed by the terms of the 
Commerce Clause itself, and the MCR’s constitutionality rests on the fact that what 
it regulates is interstate commerce.  See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 
408, 423 (1946) (“The only limitation [the Clause] places upon Congress’ power is 
in respect to what constitutes commerce, including whatever rightly may be found to 
affect it sufficiently to make Congressional regulation necessary or appropriate”).  
Upholding a regulation of interstate commerce itself poses no danger of 
transforming the Commerce Clause into a federal police power.   
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C. There Is No Constitutional Basis For Carving Out A Novel 
Exception To Congress’s Recognized Power To Regulate 
Interstate Commerce.  
1. Whether the minimum coverage requirement should be 
categorized as activity or inactivity is an artificial distinction 
irrelevant to the question of the Act’s constitutionality. 
 Appellees repeatedly proclaim a constitutional rule limiting the Commerce 
Clause to regulations affecting economic “activities.”  Appellees have manufactured 
this supposed “rule” out of whole cloth.  Their claim is simply wordplay with the 
terminology found in some judicial opinions, none of which concern a difference 
between action and inaction.  Appellees’ claim rests on the happenstance that some 
opinions have used that language.2  Neither in those opinions nor in any other 
modern case has the Supreme Court suggested the existence of any per se limitation 
on the commerce power based on such conceptual categories. “[S]uch formulas are 
not provided by the great concepts of the Constitution.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 573 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It is implausible that 
without saying so, and contrary to its long-standing acknowledgment that the 
                                                          
2 The Court uses other terms elsewhere.  See, e.g., Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 
U.S. 1, 37 (1923) (commerce power authorizes regulation of “‘[w]hatever amounts 
to more or less constant practice and threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden’” 
interstate commerce) (quoting with approval Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 
521 (1922)).  Appellants’ theory is as futile as it would be to argue that the Court’s 
use in Olsen and Stafford of the word “practice” limited the commerce power to 
“practices” as opposed to “non-practices.” 
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commerce power is plenary, the Court’s choice of wording established a new 
category of matters related to commerce but beyond congressional regulation 
because someone might not label them an “activity.”  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.  
 Moreover, the distinction between “activity” and “inactivity” proposed by 
Appellees is an artificial one.  Because, as discussed above, the vast majority of 
uninsured Americans do seek and receive often expensive emergency medical care, 
the choice to opt out of paying for health insurance is not the same as opting out of 
the health care market.  To the contrary, rather than choosing “inactivity” in the 
health care market, the decision not to buy insurance merely shifts the costs of 
providing health care to people who do have health insurance in the form of higher 
premiums, with a significant effect on the nationwide health insurance market. 
 The Court long ago concluded that “artificial” categories and “abstract 
distinction[s]” provide no proper basis for constraining the scope of the commerce 
power.  See Lopez, 514 U. S. at 556 (pre-1937 distinction between “direct” and 
indirect” effects abandoned because it “artificially had constrained the authority of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce”); id. at 572-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(approving Court’s rejection of “the abandoned abstract distinction between direct 
and indirect effects on interstate commerce”).  Appellees’ argument is a novel 
version of the same discarded mistake.   
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2. Appellees’ proposed distinction between activity and 
inactivity rests on a discredited substantive due process 
theory of economic liberty that is not cognizable in a legal 
action challenging a federal statute on Article I grounds.  
Appellees’ attempt to divide economic behavior into “activities” that 
Congress can regulate and “inactivity” that it cannot is of course reminiscent of the 
theory of economic substantive due process  associated with the famous decision in 
Lochner v. United States, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and indeed the Appellees included a 
substantive due process claim in their complaint.  In its October 14, 2010 order, the 
District Court correctly dismissed this claim, but Appellees continue to press its 
substance under the guise of their supposed “inactivity” limitation on the scope of 
the Commerce Clause.   The argument is just as fallacious when refashioned  as a 
challenge to Congress’s Article I powers.  The substantive powers enumerated in 
Article I authorize Congress to impose obligations and duties on individuals.  In the 
absence of a violation of one of the Constitution’s prohibitions on legislative power, 
Appellees’ claims are political arguments that can only receive a political remedy. 
 In any event, the claim that there is anything novel about the MCR because it 
obligates citizens to take action or denies them the “right” to be left alone is wrong.3  
                                                          
3 The MCR is not a novelty in the debate over health care.   Legislation 
requiring Americans to purchase health insurance was first introduced by 
Republican Senators in 1993.  See Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 
1993, S. 1770, 103rd Cong.  In 2006, a Democratic legislature and Republican 
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Every time the federal government requires someone to move in order to build an 
interstate highway, Congress is exercising the commerce power to require action by 
individuals who might prefer inactivity to compensation for the taking.  Congress 
has put obligations on individuals at least since the Militia Act of 1792.  In Wickard 
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942), the Court upheld Commerce Clause legislation 
despite the objection that the law “forc[ed] some farmers into the market to buy what 
they could provide for themselves.”  In parallel fashion, the MCR forces some 
taxpayers who benefit from the Act’s health care protections “into the market” to 
purchase health insurance despite claims they “could provide [it] for themselves” by 
self-insurance.  Neither in Wickard nor in the present case do these observations 
suggest a constitutional infirmity. 
Medicare, the validity of which is beyond question, also involves a 
congressionally-imposed obligation with respect to health insurance:  individual 
taxpayers must pay for health insurance they will need in old age.  The difference is 
that the MCR allows individual taxpayers to choose to purchase insurance in the 
market or pay a penalty, while under Medicare taxpayers must pay into the program.  
The MCR is thus arguably a less intrusive approach than Medicare employs to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
governor in Massachusetts adopted a health reform law with an individual mandate.  
And while Congress was formulating the Act in 2009, a plan released by former 
Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Tom Daschle, and Bob Dole through the 
Bipartisan Policy Center also advocated an individual mandate. 
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achieve Congress’s purpose of guaranteeing that individuals will be able to afford 
health care:  the MCR therefore cannot be an unconstitutional deprivation a liberty to 
remain “inactive.”  See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 59-60 (2006) (holding 
that where Congress could directly impose a requirement it cannot be 
unconstitutional for Congress to permit private choices and impose financial 
consequences).  Moreover, the MCR does not require that people receive particular 
medical care and, in fact, explicitly exempts those with a religious objection to 
modern medicine.  ACA § 10106(b)(1).   
As these examples demonstrate, there is nothing unconstitutional or unusual 
about legislation that requires individuals to bear some obligation to achieve a 
broader public goal.  In the present case, moreover, the MCR is simply “a 
coordination mechanism to ensure that everyone participates in a well-functioning 
private insurance market.  By discouraging any one of us from free-riding, the 
mandate allows each of us greater protection and more affordable coverage,” – just 
like Social Security and Medicare.  See Rahul Rajkumar & Harold Pollack, An 
Essential Mandate, L.A. Times (Jan. 7, 2011).  The Constitution presupposes the 
legitimacy of legislative authority when exercised within its express limitations.  
“There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses ... the 
Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty.”  W. Coast 
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Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937) (quotation omitted).  When, as here, 
Congress executes its enumerated powers, “the United States possesses the power ... 
to regulate the conduct of the citizen [and thus] abridge his liberty or affect his 
property.”  Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524-25 (1934). 
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to enact legislation that places 
obligations on individuals and imposes penalties for violating those obligations.  
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 401 (1940).  Liberty under 
our Constitution is liberty in a system authorizing the exercise of the governmental 
authority the Constitution delegates to Congress.  If they disagree with elements of 
the Act, Appellees may address them in the proper, democratic forum. 
3. Upholding the Act and the minimum coverage requirement 
would not render Congress’s Commerce Clause authority 
without limits. 
   The District Court opined that if the MCR is valid, “Congress could require 
that people buy and consume broccoli at regular intervals” or “require that everyone 
above a certain income threshold buy a General Motors automobile.”  Op. at 46.     
Consideration of the grave question of whether this Court must invalidate a 
landmark act of Congress is not advanced by speculation about implausible 
hypotheticals.  In any event, it is erroneous to suggest that there is no principled 
stopping point between recognizing the validity of a mandate related to an interstate 
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insurance market, and imagined laws that would impinge on an individual’s bodily 
autonomy.  The Supreme Court long ago recognized a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest in decisions about an individual’s bodily integrity.  See, e.g., Skinner 
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79.  In the unlikely event a Congress 
someday attempted to invade such a personal liberty as the interest in refusing to eat 
a certain food, a significant constitutional issue would be posed. 
 The judiciary possesses authority and doctrinal tools to address laws that 
interfere oppressively with an individual’s physical integrity.  It is quite unnecessary 
to return to Lochner or deny Congress the authority to regulate an interstate market 
in order to prevent an Orwellian state.  There is a familiar and principled distinction 
between personal freedoms that the courts protect by searching analysis of 
legislation restricting them, and “‘liberties which derive merely from shifting 
economic arrangements.’”  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 605, 651 (1972) (quoting 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).  Freedoms 
related to the individual’s physical integrity come to the courts “‘with a momentum 
for respect lacking when appeal is made to’” economic liberty.  Id. 
The District Court’s concern that a decision upholding the MCR would 
license Congress “to require that individuals buy … virtually any good or service,” 
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is equally unwarranted.   Two factors make the health insurance market unique.  
First, as the Supreme Court has observed, insurance is uniquely and by definition 
“‘an arrangement for transferring and distributing risk.’” Group Life & Health Ins. 
Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979) (citation omitted).  As a 
consequence, a “fundamental object” of insurance “is to distribute … loss over as 
wide an area as possible.”  Id. at 212 (citation omitted).  The power effectively to 
regulate the pricing structure of an insurance market necessarily involves the power 
to regulate the area over which the risks are spread – a characteristic of insurance 
that can be said of no other market.  Second, health care is distinctive in that almost 
every individual will, at some point, require health care and yet (unlike food and 
housing, for example) the timing and costs of those needs are unpredictable:  health 
insurance is, as a consequence, the only practicable way in which health care can be 
financed.  And existing state and federal laws, which embody a basic and permanent 
commitment of the American people, already require that the costs of health care for 
the uninsured are transferred to other market participants, thus creating an inefficient 
and inequitable public substitute for private insurance.   
The MCR merely regulates the unavoidable impact that individuals have on 
this singular market in order to make its financing more efficient and eliminate its 
current inequities.  Whatever constitutional concerns might be posed by recognizing 
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that Congress has a general power to require the purchase of goods or services are 
quite inapposite to the evaluation of Congress’s regulation of the health insurance 
market with its unique characteristics.    
II. CONGRESS ALSO HAS POWER UNDER THE NECESSARY AND 
PROPER CLAUSE TO ADOPT THE MINIMUM COVERAGE 
REQUIREMENT AS A MEANS CONGRESS DEEMS APPROPRIATE 
AND CONDUCIVE TO ACCOMPLISH THE ENDS OF THE 
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT. 
The Constitution grants Congress certain enumerated powers, and also 
authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution th[os]e foregoing Powers.”  Art. I,  § 8, cl. 9.  Because the MCR is a direct 
regulation of interstate commerce, we think it unnecessary to consider Congress’s 
additional powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Were there any doubt 
that the MCR is a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power, however, the 
provision is a valid means to the full and effective execution of the Act.4 
                                                          
4 The District Court, in its October 14, 2010 order, concluded that the Act and 
the MCR could not be viewed as exercises of Congress’s powers “To lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, [and] to … provide for the … general Welfare 
of the United States[.]”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  Amici disagree with the District 
Court but do not address this point in detail.  
We note, nonetheless, that Congress’s General Welfare Clause power is 
“extensive,” License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1867), and the MCR fits 
well within this authority.  The Act requires individuals to obtain coverage or pay a 
penalty through the tax system.  ACA § 1501(b).  The tax penalty is codified in the 
Internal Revenue Code; it applies only to taxpayers otherwise required to file 
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A. The Necessary And Proper Clause Empowers Congress To 
Choose The Means Best Suited In Its Judgment To Execute Its 
Express Powers, As Long As The Means Are Conducive To A 
Constitutionally Legitimate Legislative End.      
 Since McCulloch v. Maryland, it has been settled law that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause empowers Congress to choose those means that Congress deems 
necessary to the effective exercise of its enumerated powers.  See McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).  As the Supreme Court held in 
McCulloch, the Clause does not limit Congress to choose only those means that are 
necessary in some strictly logical sense, a rule that would render the federal 
government unworkable.  Id. at 415-16, 420-21.  Rather, the Clause permits 
Congress to adopt any means “appropriate” to the achievement of any legitimate 
congressional purpose: 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, 
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that 
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
income tax returns; it is calculated with reference to an individual’s income; it is 
assessed and collected like other tax penalties; and it is enforced by the Internal 
Revenue Service.  Congress expected the provision to raise revenue for the federal 
government.  In part because of the MCR, the Act is projected to reduce the budget 
deficit by $143 billion over ten years.  CBO Letter to Nancy Pelosi (Mar. 20, 2010), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/AmendReconProp.pdf.   
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Id. at 421.  The Court recently reaffirmed the breadth of the Clause in United 
States v. Comstock, where it recognized that the concern expressed in Lopez 
about “pil[ing] inference on inference” has no place in analyzing a provision 
that is a Necessary and Proper means to executing an enumerated power.  130 
S. Ct. 1949, 1963 (2010) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567).     
B. The Minimum Coverage Requirement Is An Appropriate Means 
Of Executing The Act’s Regulation Of The Interstate Health 
Care Insurance Market, Is Plainly Adapted To The End Of 
Assuring Affordable Health Care For All Americans, And 
Violates No Constitutional Prohibition. 
 The Act’s purpose, to make affordable health insurance available to all 
Americans, is a constitutionally legitimate end.  See South-Eastern Underwriters, 
322 U.S. at 552-53.  As described above, Congress carefully explained why the 
MCR is essential to the Act’s broader goal.  Appellees present no plausible claim 
that the MCR violates any express constitutional prohibition; their suggestion that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause itself imposes such a prohibition is contrary to both 
principle and precedent.5  Since the MCR is “plainly adapted” to Congress’s 
                                                          
5 In Comstock, the Court repeatedly stressed the difference between the 
Necessary and Proper Clause issue and any individual liberty claims in that case.  
130 S. Ct. at 1954, 1956, 1957, 1965.   The Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be 
used to repackage an individual-liberty argument, such as a Fifth Amendment 
economic due process claim, into a claim about Congress’s Article I powers. 
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legitimate regulatory end, the provision is, plainly, valid under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. 
 The Supreme Court has maintained ever since McCulloch that Congress may 
choose any means “conducive to the complete accomplishment of [its] object” – that 
is, appropriate to render its legislation completely effective.  See McCulloch, 17 U.S. 
at 424.  The Necessary and Proper Clause does not invite courts to overturn 
Congress’s choices because litigants may prefer that Congress seek its goals through 
different measures.  In McCulloch, the Court explained that even if the constitutional 
“necessity” of a national bank were “less apparent” than the Court believed, “none 
can deny its being an appropriate measure; and if it is, the degree of its necessity, as 
has been very justly observed, is to be discussed in another place” – that is, Congress.  
17 U.S. at 423.  Modern cases state this principle using the rational basis test: the 
Clause requires only that “a federal statute represent a rational means for 
implementing a constitutional grant of legislative authority.”  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 
at 1962.  The issue in this case is therefore not whether this Court concludes that the 
MCR is in fact necessary to “the complete accomplishment” of Congress’s goals 
“but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 22; 
see also Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.  
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 Congress, through the Act, has used its constitutional powers to ensure that all 
Americans have access to quality, affordable health care, while significantly 
reducing long-term health care costs.  Although Appellees may not agree with these 
goals, they are well within Congress’s constitutional bounds. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court below should be affirmed. 
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